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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of 
LLOYD A. FRY COMPANY, 
Appellant, 
Civil No. 13980 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The appellant, Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company, respectfully 
petitions the Court for a rehearing on the decision rendered 
on December 30, 1975, affirming the findings of the Utah Air 
Conservation Committee that emissions from Fryfs plant 
violated Section 3.2 of the Code of Air Conservation Regulations 
providing that emissions shall be of a shade in density no 
darker than a No. 2 Ringelmann Chart (40% black), upon the 
following grounds: 
1. The Court did not fully consider the question of 
the constitutionality of the Air Conservation Act. 
2. The decision does not correctly assess the facts, 
nor does it apply the standard necessary for the Air Conservation 
Committee to prove the alleged violation. 
3. The procedure set out in the Act does not safeguard the 
right of a person accused of violating its regulations to a 
fair hearing. There is inherent prejudice and bias in the 
administrative process conducted in this instance. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT FULLY CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AIR CONSERVATION ACT. 
The Statute is unconstitutional on its face for the r 
following reasons: (a) It permits an administrative agency 
to impose a criminal penalty for an alleged violation of its 
regulations without the necessity of compliance with constitutional 
standards of proof in determining whether a violation occurred; 
and (b) the procedure followed by the examining committee in 
conducting a hearing as to whether a violation has occurred 
is inherently unfair to the accused. 
We have no quarrel with the statement in the opinion 
that under Section 26-24-11(1)(a) the procedure under which 
the Air Conservation Committee (hereinafter called "Committee") 
determines whether a violation of its regulations has occurred, 
is administrative in nature; however, it is of vital importance 
that due consideration be given to the constitutional ramifications 
of the original procedure by which the Committee makes a 
determination, the method of the determination, and its 
effect. 
Section 26-24-11(1)(a), the procedure by which the 
Committee determines a person is in violation of its regulations, 
is set out as follows: 
Violations - Notice - Hearings - Orders -
Variance - Exceptions. - (1)(a) Whenever the 
executive secretary has reason to believe that a 
violation of any provision of this act or any 
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rule, regulation, or standard issued under it, has 
occurred, he may cause written notice to be served 
upon the alleged violator or violators. The 
notice shall specify the provision of this act or 
rule, regulation, or standard alleged to be violated, 
and the facts alleged to constitute the violation 
and may include an order that necessary corrective 
action be taken within a reasonable time. Any 
such order shall become final unless, no later 
than twenty days after the date the notice and 
order are served, the person or persons named 
therein request in writing a hearing before the 
committee. Upon such request, the committee shall 
hold a hearing. In lieu of an order, the executive 
secretary may require that the alleged violator or 
violators appear before the committee for a hearing 
at a time and place specified in the notice and 
answer the charges complained of, or the committee 
may initiate an action pursuant to section 26-24-
13. 
It is clear from this section that the executive secretary 
of the Committee, a hearing examiner of the Committee, or 
any committee member as hearing examiner, can make a decision 
which, in effect, results in a final order of violation. 
The decision from which this Petition arises held that the 
moving party, the Air Conservation Committee, or anyone 
charging a violation of this Act, need not prove that charge 
beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a review of the entire 
Air Conservation Act, it its entirety, compels the conclusion 
that in order for the Act to be constitutional, the Committee 
making a charge that a violation exists under this Act, or 
the rules, regulations, etc. thereunder, must prove that 
charge beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish 
guilt. 
The "constitutional problem" becomes apparent in the 
Committee's decision pursuant to Section 26-24-11 (1) (a), 
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when considered in conjunction with Section 26-24-13(1)(a), 
which states: 
Any person who violates any provision of this 
Act, or any rule, regulation, order (other than an 
order requiring compliance with an implementation 
plan), or standard in force under this Act, other 
than Section 26-24-16, or who causes or permits to 
be caused air pollution as defined in Section 26-
24-2 of any air resource of the state, shall be 
guilty of an offense and subject to a fine of not 
more than $10,000 for each day of violation. 
* * * 
The Act provides that the Committee can determine under an 
"administrative hearing procedure1' whether or not a "violation11 
has occurred. Under Section 26-24-13, if a violation has 
occurred, the person in violation is "guilty of an offense 
and subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 for each day 
of violation." The wording of this Statute clearly sets out 
a criminal penalty. Granted, the Statute is vague and 
indefinite; however, if possible, the legislative intent 
must be taken directly from the four corners of the Statute 
in order to comprehend its full force and effect. Here, the 
Legislature has provided that if a violation is determined, 
which, if the decision of the Supreme Court is allowed to 
stand, can be determined by an administrative agency, then 
the violator is "guilty of an offense and subject to a fine 
of not more than $10,000 for each day of violation." The 
Statute goes on to increase the amount of fine from $10,000 
to $25,000 and even $50,000 for each day of violation under 
a determination made by an administrative agency without the 
constitutional guarantee that the Committee has the burden 
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of proving ^ e offense beyond a reasonab] e doubt or even by"" 
a pi eponderance of the evidence, There (.in be no doubt that • • 
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maintain substantially clean air, However, before libertu > " 
ol* Individuals are violated ami loss of property resell! , t '" -; ,; 
1
 'Sin' I il HI i nil,ill i mi MiiibonI upon I he moving party to 
establish, if least beyond conjecture, that a violation ol •••• ' • "' / 
las has occurred suffieionn in in* i h< • mp I oniuil ,i t ion f 
penallies s J lit i 1 a r to those provided bv the Air Conservation ;': •-'• ';' 
A c t . •• ' . ' • • -. • • ' - ••• •-••- ;• , •.. 
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As stated in the Supreme Court case of Huntington v, Attrill, 
146 U.S. 657, 13 S.Ct. 224 (1892). the test as to whether a 
statute is penal, according to the United States Supreme 
Court, Mis not by what the name the statute is called by the 
legislature or the courts of the state in which it was 
passed, but whether it appears to the tribunal which is 
called upon to enforce it to be, in its essential character 
and effect, a punishment of an offense against the public, 
or a grant of a civil right to a private person." It is 
clear that the effect of the Air Conservation Act is penal 
in nature. It provides for a penalty, it holds that an 
individual in violation is "guilty of an offense," and , ' 
thereafter subject to a fine of not to exceed $10,000 per 
day. Certainly, the language used in the Statute sheds 
light on the legislative intent that the effect of the 
Statute is to punish the "violator" for an offense against 
the public. Certainly, an administrative committee has the 
right and duty to formulate regulations to carry out the 
objectives of a statute, but to permit the committee in this 
instance to set up rules, hold a hearing on whether a person 
has violated the rules, find the accused guilty, and then 
levy a criminal penalty, i.e., a fine of $10,000 a day, 
is analogous to permitting the IRS to charge a taxpayer for 
failure to pay taxes, hold a hearing, find him guilty, and 
levy a penalty, without ever proving the accused's guilt in 
a court proceeding. 
Presently, there is a criminal action pending against 
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the appellant in the Bountiful City Court (Exhibit A). Note 
that the action was quiescent until the date of this decision, 
and has now been reactivated. Query: Can the decision of 
the Committee be used as evidence in this criminal proceeding? 
If an additional action can also be brought against Fry, and 
the determinations made by the Committee holding the appellant 
in violation admitted as evidence of guilt, certainly Fry 
has suffered a violation of "due process." In addition, the Court 
is invited to consider that, statutes imposing fines and 
penalties are penal in nature and have, and always will be 
strictly construed. 36 Am.Jur.2d Forfeitures and Fines, 
Section 8, p. 615. 
The statement in the opinion that "Fry's claim that the 
burden of proof was upon the state to prove that the plume 
did not contain uncombined water is erroneous," misconstrues 
the definition of a contaminant as set out in the Statute, 
and the Code of Air Conservation Regulations. 1.1.3 of the 
Code states: 
Air contaminant means any particulate matter or 
any gas, vapor, suspended solid or any combination 
thereof, excluding steam and water vapors (Section 
26-24-2(1), UCA, 1953, as amended). 
3.2.6. (d) states: 
An emission failing to meet the standard because 
of the effect of uncombined water shall not be in 
violation. 
This does not mean that uncombined water is an exception to 
the regulation, but can only mean that water vapor is not a 
contaminant. Certainly, the committee which asserts a 
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violation has the burden of proving that a plume which is 
observed to be more than 40% opaque, equivalent to No, 2 
Ringelmann, is not opaque because of water vapor, which is 
not a contaminant. A plume of pure steam (water vapor) can 
exceed 40% opacity and is not a violation. The decision 
seems to indicate that if an inspector reads a plume as in 
excess of 40% opacity, there is a presumption of violation 
irrespective of whether the plume contains uncombined water 
vapor. There is no statement in the decision that the 
Committee has the burden of proving the charges by a preponderance 
of the evidence. Even where a criminal penalty is not 
involved, the principle is well established that a moving 
party who asserts a proposition has the burden of proving 
the assertion by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 Am.Jur.2d, 
Sec. 391 states: 
It is generally held that the proper allocation 
of the burden of proof is among the essential 
rules of evidence which must be observed in adjudi-
cations by administrative agencies. As in court 
proceedings, the burden of proof, apart from 
statute, is on the party asserting the affirmative 
of an issue before an administrative tribunal. 
This is usually the claimant, complainant, or 
applicant, but the party resisting a claim may 
have the burden of proving a bar to such claim, 
such as a statutory exception, and, while the 
burden of proof never shifts, the burden of proceeding 
with the presentation of evidence does shift. 
In disciplinary administrative proceedings, which in 
some aspects are analogous to this situation, the burden of 
proof is upon the party asserting the affirmative. Johnstone 
vs. Daly City, District Court of Appeals, First District, 
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Division 2, California, 319 P.2d 756 (1958) is illustrative 
of the general rule. This case involved a mandamus proceeding 
to compel a city manager to restore petitioner to position 
of public inspector. The Court said: 
In disciplinary administrative proceedings, 
burden of proof is upon party asserting the affirmative 
and guilt must be established to a reasonable 
certainty and cannot be based on surmise or conjecture, 
suspicion or theoretical conclusions, or uncorroborated 
hearsay. 
The case of St. Lewis vs. Eskridge, Missouri, 486 
S.W.2d 648 (1972) cited in the opinion in opposition to 
Fryfs contention that the burden is on the Committee to 
prove that the plume did not contain uncombined water vapor, 
is not in point. That decision involved a prosecution under 
a criminal statute, in which the defendant was convicted of 
violating an nair pollution control ordinance." The appellate 
court held that information alleging defendant had violated 
the ordinance was not defective for failure to allege that 
the emission was not due to "presence of uncombined water." 
Obviously, this case involved a pleading question on whether 
the prosecution in the information was required to negate an 
exception to the ordinance. Again, the presence of uncombined 
water vapor is not an exception to Section 3.2.1 of the 
Code, because water vapor is not a contaminant. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION DID NOT ASSESS THE EVIDENCE AND THE WEIGHT 
TO BE GIVEN IT IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOLLOWING UNCONTROVERTED 
FACTS. 
The smoke school maintained by the Committee, trained 
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the students to read smoke plumes from an imcomplete combustion 
process under inside controlled conditions at a distance of 
ten feet. The students1 readings were compared with equivalent 
opacity on a Ringelmann chart. No training was given on wet 
plumes (white), and there was and. is no other plume in the 
State of Utah emitted as a result of a process similar to 
Fry. The training for reading a wet plume, according to 
Alvin Rickers, who was in charge of instruction at the smoke 
school, was for the student to observe a couple of situations 
in the field. His testimony is quoted verbatim as follows: 
Q. Now, what actual training do you give them 
which would enable them to determine when the 
water vapor is dissipated out of a wet plume? 
A. At this school we have not come up with a 
means to do this from our smoke generator. Any-
thing that goes past that--first of all, we want 
to stay as objective as we can in our smoke school 
and, therefore, we have to use our meter for our 
authority on what's being emitted. If we are to 
inject water into the system and it was not all 
condensed when it went by that meter, then we 
wouldn't know what we have. Consequently, we do 
not do that in that portion of the school. 
Q. Well, just what training do you give them 
in helping them to determine when a water vapor in 
a plume is dissipated from the plume? 
A. For our enforcement personnel, and these 
are the people that are going out continuously on 
this type of thing, before they are released to 
make any contact by themselves with the public. 
In other words, before they are given that authority, 
they go out with experienced people who give them 
some training and it doesn't take much training. 
It's just a matter of showing them a couple of 
situations and after; that it's fairly easily 
recognized. 
Q. Of course, the distance the plume travels 
before the water vapor is dissipated from the 
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plume, again, depends upon the weather conditions, 
the amount of humidity in the air and a number of 
other things, doesn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell me, were you taken out to be 
trained in determining at what point the water 
would be dissipated from the water plume; did 
somebody take you out? 
A. Yes, A former employee of the organization 
took me out. 
Q» And, how many times were you taken out? 
A. I only went out with him once. That was 
all that was needed. 
Q. Well, I didn't ask you that. You only went 
out with him once. Just answer my question, if 
you will. 
A. Okay. 
Q. And, where did you make this training? 
A. This was out at Kennecott Cooper Corpora-
tion. 
Q. Does Kennecott Copper Corporation have the 
same kind of processes that Fry Roofing has? 
A. No. 
Q. Well, then, prior to the time you made your 
evaluation you had never had any training in 
determining when the water vapor became separated 
from the plume so far as the processes similar to 
the Fry Roofing Company is concerned? 
A. No. 
* * * 
Q. Now, as a matter of fact, there isn't any 
other process in the State of Utah where felt is 
saturated with asphalt as is done in the Fry 
Roofing plant, is there? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. That's the only one? 
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A, It's the only one. 
The Committee's witnesses conceded that Msubjective 
variations11 in readings could range from 1% or less (Tr. 
72). In the HEW study introduced into evidence as Exhibit 3 
on page 28, are the results of evaluation of white training 
plumes by six inspectors, indicating a wide range of subjective 
variation. 
It was conceded by the executive director of the Committee, 
Grant Winn, that the fact that there isn't a definite break 
in the plume at the point where the water vapor dissipates, 
requires a subjective estimate by the viewer as to where the 
water vapor evaporates (Tr. 30). The evidence was uncontroverted 
that the emission from the Fry stacks is of a higher temperature 
than the ambient surrounding air. It doesn't require evidence 
to establish, and the court can judicially notice that upon 
contact with the outside atmosphere, the edges of the plume 
would cool first, condensing the moisture, and the cooling 
process would continue towards the center of the plume until 
all of the moisture was dissipated, which would have to be a 
gradual process, the rapidity of which would depend upon 
existing atmospheric conditions: temperature, humidity, wind 
and barometric pressure. The testimony that there is an 
abrupt break in the plume where all the water vapor is 
dissipated is incredible and not probative evidence (Tr. 26-
30). 
In answer to a question from the chairman of the 
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examining committee, the witness Rickers testified that they 
instructed students, when taking a reading, to have the sun 
to their back, that they be perpendicular to the effluent 
stream, and that they be two and one half stack lengths away 
from the stack when the observation was made (Tr. 100). The 
evidence was conclusive that there was no compliance with 
uniform guidelines by the inspectors in taking the readings, 
some made in observation, some made at different positions 
and for different lengths of time (See appellant!s brief, 
pp. 32-35). It is worthy of note that the inspectors did not 
use a Ringelmann Chart on the site for comparison in reading 
the Fry plume, but compared the opacity of the plume with their 
memory of the designated shades of opacity shown on the chart. 
That their memory of the opacity shades shown on the Ringelmann 
Chart tends to become inaccurate is indicated by the requirement 
that the inspectors1 "eye-balls" be recalibrated every six months. 
Some of the inspectors observed a more dense plume from the 
east stack than the west stack which was impossible as all 
of the moisture driven out of the felt by the impact 
of the hot asphalt was collected in an overhead steel hood 
and could only be emitted from the west stack (Tr., Vol. II, 
p. 134), casting further doubt on the reliability of those 
readings. 
The decision cites the case of State vs. Lloyd A. Fry 
Roofing Co. 9 Or. A189, 495 P.2d 751, 51 ALR3d 1007 (1972) 
for authority that the weight to be accorded the testimony 
of the smoke readers and conflicting testimony of the experts 
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on the accuracy and reliability of smoke reading was within 
the perogatives of the fact finders. It is interesting to 
note that this was a court decision (not an administrative 
hearing) in which Fry was found guilty of violating air 
pollution rules. That case involved reading a Mwet plume." 
Objections were made by Fry that the testimony of the nsmoke 
readers" was inadmissible because they had no training in 
reading a wet plume. The testimony was admitted because the 
readings were 80% opacity, double the 40% opacity limitation. 
The Court felt that the high reading of 80% eliminated the 
effect of subjective error. The Court said: 
The training CWAPA gives its smoke readers as ~ 
to wet plumes may well not be optimum, and this 
presents a close question concerning the admissibility 
of Bispham's and McDonald's testimony. Since they 
testified that defendant s plume obscured 80 per 
cent or more of the background (or, in other 
words, more than twice the amount of background 
obscuration to constitute a violation), and since 
there was no showing that the amount of visible 
water in defendant's plume could have such a 
substantial impact on their readings, we resolve 
this close question in favor of the state. We 
agree with both trial judges in their conclusion 
that the variables revealed by these records go to 
the weight and not the admissibility of Bispham's 
and McDonald's testimony. 
In this instance there was no reading higher than 60%, one 
of which was made on the emission from the east stack. 
In 51 ALR3d 1038, 1039, the editor quotes the decision 
of Bortz Coal Co. vs. Air Pollution Com. (1971, Pa. Cmwlth) 
1 ELR 20393, as follows: 
Pointing out that the expert used none of the 
available instruments for testing smoke emissions 
or falling particulate matter and made no stack 
tests, the court concluded that if employees of 
the commission were allowed to determine that 
smoke a particulate matter emissions were in 
violation of regulations, based solely upon visual 
observations, then there would be really no need 
to have standards and regulations at all. Visual 
tests and observations are not, the court said, 
adequate evidence of violation, where recognized 
scientific tests are available. Expressing familiarity Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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with the Ringelmann Smoke Chart, the court ex-
pressed puzzlement as to why such an inexpensive 
method of testing was not used and why an engineer 
employed by the Commonwealth would not be equipped 
with such an inexpensive device. A citizen whose 
business is about to be destroyed by an abatement 
order, the court declared, is certainly entitled 
to that much consideration (the use of test instru-
ments) in the establishment of his alleged violation. 
The above language seems appropriate in this situation. 
There was no evidence that the emission from the Fry 
plant, including the particulate, was a contaminant as 
defined in the statute. 26-24-2(3) provides: 
"Air pollution" means the presence in the 
ambient air of one or more air contaminants in 
such quantities and duration and under conditions 
and circumstances as is or tends to be injurious 
to human health or welfare, animal or plant life, 
or property, or would unreasonably interfere with 
the enjoyment of life or use of property, as 
determined by the standards, rules, and regu-
lations adopted by the air conservation committee. 
The record is absent of any evidence that the emission 
was or tended to be "injurious to human health or welfare, 
animal or plant life, or property, or would unreasonably 
interfere with the enjoyment of life or use of property." 
There was no evidence of any complaint from any individual 
concerning a problem with the Fry emissions. The plant is 
located in the North Salt Lake industrial area, and reference 
to the photographs, Ex. 15 and 15A, certainly do not show 
the type of emission which would have an adverse effect on 
people or the environment, particularly when the evidence 
was undisputed that the Fry process does not involve combustion, 
and is composed of 97.7% water and 2.3% asphalt. 
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Granted, whether an emission is a contaminant is to be 
determined by standards, rules and regulations adopted by 
the Air Conservation Committee, But those standards, rules 
and regulations must have a factual basis to meet constitutional 
requirements. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, cited in 
appellant's brief. 
Again, we say that the definitions of air pollution as 
set out in the Utah Statute negates the contention that 
opacity is the equivalent of air pollution. 
POINT III 
THE PROCEDURE SET OUT IN THE ACT DOES NOT SAFEGUARD THE 
RIGHT OF A PERSON ACCUSED OF VIOLATING ITS REGULATIONS TO A 
FAIR HEARING. THERE IS INHERENT PREJUDICE AND BIAS IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS CONDUCTED IN THIS INSTANCE. 
The smoke readers are employees of the State of Utah 
and are directly related to the Air Conservation Committee 
through the Department of Health. The charges and alleged 
violations are then analyzed by the Air Conservation Committee 
themselves, who are charged by law to enforce their own 
regulations. Whenever a hearing is held on the matter, it 
is supervised by a legal advisor who, in this case, was John 
Spencer Snow, who participated in writing the brief on 
appeal. We do not contend that Mr. Snow did not attempt to 
decide questions of law in an impartial manner; however, he 
is an advocate, and it is most unusual for him to act as 
impartial legal advisor, to then participate in writing the 
Committee's appeal brief and then argue it. From the very 
beginning, this was not an adversary proceeding, and it 
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could not be under the circumstances. 
The hearing was attended by Federal EPA employees, who, 
although they had no official interest in the outcome, were 
constantly communicating with members of the hearing committee 
at times while the hearing was in process. There was also 
continuous communication between the members of the hearing 
committee and its witnesses, which disrupted the hearing to 
the extent that at one point it was necessary for Fry's 
counsel to make an objection (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 127), which 
was sustained by the legal advisor. The transcript clearly 
shows that the Committee took the position that the burden 
was on Fry to prove that it was not in violation, which was 
a violation of due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Everyone is in favor of ffclean air" and of reasonable 
regulation of industry to obtain that objective. However, 
we do live in an industrial age, which has given this nation 
the highest standard of living enjoyed by any country in the 
world. 
If the Fry plant can be closed down, based upon the 
type of subjective testimony given in this case, without 
regard to the requirements of constitutional standards of 
proof, the precedent established will certainly encourage 
a depressing effect on existing and the future expansion 
of industry in this State, contrary to the public interest. 
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We submit the decision should be withdrawn and a 
rehearing granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, WADSWORTH $ RUSSON 
^AiiJsl !Hr^^^\ 
torfrey foi\l Appellant 
RI 
At n J p < 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
HAND-DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing 
this"^/^| day of Februa ry 1976, to John Spencer Snow, Assistant 
Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
w \^O^Ly^ C. (4**i*~-~ 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
January 6, 1976 
Rex J. Hanson 
Attorney at Law 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Re: State -vs- Lloyd A. Fry Roofing U-722 
Dear Mr* Hanson: 
Please be advised that arraignment in the above 
matter has been scheduled for Monday, January 19, 
1976 at 2:00 P.M. in the Bountiful City Court, 
745 South Main, Bountiful, Utah. 
You will be required to appear with your clieht 
at that time* 
If you have any questions, please contact the -
Court. 
BOUNTIFUL CITY COURT 
Deputy Clerk 
cc 
I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full true and correct 
copy of the LETTER TO APPEAR on file in the Bountiful City Court. 
Arden F. Jenson, Clerk 
By Janet Davis Deputy Clerk 
S W ^ ^Ja^t^z, 
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IN THE CITY COURT OF BOUNTIFUL, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff, : 
VS. : SUMMONS 
LLOYD A. FRY ROOFING COMPANY, : 
Defendant. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
« 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) SS 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO LLOYD A FRY ROOFING COMPANY: 
You are hereby summoned to appear before me at my 
Court in Bountiful, Davis County, State of Utah, oh the 
£"** day of C/^^'vjfc 1973, at**?;*** o'clock, to 
answer a charge made against you upon the complaint of 
Richard L. Harvey, for violating the Visible Emissions Standards 
of the Utah State Division of Health Code of Air Conservation 
Regulations, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 26-24-5 and 
26-15-5. 
Dated at Bountiful , Davis County, State of Utah, 
this OG day of July, 1973-
/b-t//"7 J 
Yyl- — ^ 
S. Mark Johnson/'Judge 
Defendant's Address: 
Process Agent: C. T. Corporation &vstern 
175 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
J- ' • • r — 
I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full true and correct copy 
of the SUMMONS on file in the Bountiful City Court. '-* 
Arden F. Jenson, Clerk 
By_Janet Da^ie, Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE CITY COURT OF BOUNTIFUL, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : COMPLAINT 
LLOYD A. FRY ROOFING COMPANY : 
Defendant. : 
On this lJ> day of July, 1973, before me, S. Mark 
Johnson, Judge of the Bountiful City Court, personally 
appeared Richard L. Harvey, who being duly sworn by me on 
his oath, complains and says that: 
1. The Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company, is a Delaware 
Corporation, General Offices located in Illinois, registered 
to conduct business within the State of Utah, with a facility 
operating in Woods Cross, Davis County, Utah; 
2. That Richard L. Harvey is the Administrator 
of Environmental Health Services for Davis County, Utah, and 
as such has authority to investigate violations of the Utah 
Air Conservation Act. 
3. That on June 27, 1972; July 6, 1972; July 13, 
1972; July 17, 1972; July 27, 1972; August 3, 1972; August 7f 
1972; August 10, 1972; August 15, 1972; August 31, 1972; 
September 5, 1972; September 14, 1972; September 21, 1972; 
October 2, 1972; November 22, 1972; December 27, 1972; 
January 23, 1973; and February 20, 1973, at Woods Cross, 
County of Davis, State of Utah, the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing 
Company did on each date specified commit the offense of 
violating the Visible Emissions Standards of the Code of Air 
Conservation Regulations, Part Three (3) of the Utah State 
Division of Health Cod£ of Air Conservation Regulations
 f 
enacted under authority of Utah Code Annotated Sections 26-24-5 
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and 26-15-5, as follows: That on the above dates the Lloyd A. 
Fry Roofing Company caused the emission of an effluent into 
the atmosphere which was Of Shade or density darker than a 
No. 2 Rengelmann Chart (40% Black) or an equivalent opacity, 
for which offenses the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company itiay b6 
subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 for each day of such 
violation. 
/ 
Complainant 
Subscribed and sworn before me the day and year first above 
written. 
^y&^y 
S. Mark Johnson, Judge 
I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full true and correct 
copy of the COMPLAINT on file in the Bountiful City Coutt. 
Arcten F. Jenson , Clerk 
By Janet Davis Clerk 
• & • • : 
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